Short answer
Yes. The clearest case is in chapter 9. Verses 59 to 63 let a woman with no son be appointed to bear one by her husband's brother. Verses 64 to 68 then say this violates the eternal law, and call it a practice fit for cattle. Georg Bühler, who translated the book, says these verses "flatly contradict" the rules before them. An old Hindu law book says Manu declared the practice and then prohibited it. Commentators gave different answers, and each fails against the words. After the ban, the book still gives such a son his inheritance. So the contradictions point to many human hands, not one source of perfect knowledge. Islam's answer is the Qur'an's own test: a book from anyone but God (﷾) would hold much discrepancy.
| Question | Verses 59-63 | Verses 64-68 |
|---|---|---|
| Is it allowed? | Yes, for a woman with no son | No: those who do it “will violate the eternal law” |
| What is it called? | An appointment “in accordance with the law” | A practice “fit for cattle” |
| What do the good say? | Some sages allow even a second son | “The virtuous censure” the man who does it |
Full explanation
What the book says about itself
The Manusmriti, the Laws of Manu, is a Hindu law book. It belongs to smriti, the remembered tradition, which ranks below the Veda. Its claims are still high. It says the Creator composed these laws and taught them to Manu. It says whatever Manu ordained is fully declared in the Veda. Bühler's translation gives the reason: "for that (sage was) omniscient". Two commentators, Govindaraja and Medhatithi, apply that clause to the Veda, which holds all knowledge. On either reading, the law rests on perfect knowledge. It says the Veda and the law books must never be called into question. Another law book, the Brihaspati Smriti, gives Manu the first rank and refuses any law book opposed to him. So a contradiction here is no small slip. Perfect knowledge does not say yes and no to one question.
“But he having composed these Institutes (of the sacred law), himself taught them, according to the rule, to me alone in the beginning; next I (taught them) to Marîki and the other sages.”
“Whatever law has been ordained for any (person) by Manu, that has been fully declared in the Veda: for that (sage was) omniscient.”
“But by Sruti (revelation) is meant the Veda, and by Smriti (tradition) the Institutes of the sacred law: those two must not be called into question in any matter, since from those two the sacred law shone forth.”
“(However) the first rank (among legislators) belongs to Manu, because he has embodied the essence of the Veda in his work; that Smriti (or text of law) which is opposed to the tenor of the laws of Manu is not approved.”
The rule: a woman may be appointed to bear a son
Chapter 9 sets out niyoga, which means appointment. A woman with no son may be authorised to bear one by her husband's brother, or by another close relative of her husband. The aim is to raise up a son for the man who has none. Manu gives this as law, with details. It says how the man must come to her. It says he may father one son and no second, then adds that some sages allow a second. It says the two must afterwards behave like a father and a daughter-in-law. If they act from desire, both become outcasts. Medhatithi, the oldest commentator whose work survives, says verse 59 "enjoins the practice". So this is no passing remark. It is a rule, with conditions and a penalty.
“On failure of issue (by her husband) a woman who has been authorised, may obtain, (in the) proper (manner prescribed), the desired offspring by (cohabitation with) a brother-in-law or (with some other) Sapinda (of the husband). He (who is) appointed to (cohabit with) the widow shall (approach her) at night anointed with clarified butter and silent, (and) beget one son, by no means a second. Some (sages), versed in the law, considering the purpose of the appointment not to have been attained by those two (on the birth of the first), think that a second (son) may be lawfully procreated on (such) women. But when the purpose of the appointment to (cohabit with) the widow has been attained in accordance with the law, those two shall behave towards each other like a father and a daughter-in-law. If those two (being thus) appointed deviate from the rule and act from carnal desire, they will both become outcasts, (as men) who defile the bed of a daughter-in-law or of a Guru.”
“The son of a wife, not appointed (to have issue by another), and he whom (an appointed female, already) the mother of a son, bears to her brother-in-law, are both unworthy of a share, (one being) the son of an adulterer and (the other) produced through (mere) lust. Even the male (child) of a female (duly) appointed, not begotten according to the rule (given above), is unworthy of the paternal estate; for he was procreated by an outcast. A son (legally) begotten on such an appointed female shall inherit like a legitimate son of the body; for that seed and the produce belong, according to the law, to the owner of the soil. He who takes care of his deceased brother's estate and of his widow, shall, after raising up a son for his brother, give that property even to that (son). If a woman (duly) appointed bears a son to her brother-in-law or to another (Sapinda), that (son, if he is) begotten through desire, they declare (to be) incapable of inheriting and to be produced in vain.”
“This verse enjoins the practice of 'Niyoga', hemmed in by all its qualifications.”
The next verses: the same practice condemned
Verse 64 follows straight after those rules. It says a widow must not be appointed to any man but her husband. Those who do so "will violate the eternal law". The Sanskrit is dharmam hanyuh sanatanam. Sanatana dharma, the eternal law, is the name many Hindus give their faith today. Verse 65 says the sacred texts on marriage nowhere mention the practice. Verse 66 calls it pashu-dharma, a practice "fit for cattle", and says it occurred among men while King Vena ruled. Verse 67 says his mind was destroyed by lust. Verse 68 says the virtuous have censured anyone who does it from that time on. So this is more than a change of rule. An act that is lawful with conditions in one verse violates the eternal law in the next.
“By twice-born men a widow must not be appointed to (cohabit with) any other (than her husband); for they who appoint (her) to another (man), will violate the eternal law. In the sacred texts which refer to marriage the appointment (of widows) is nowhere mentioned, nor is the re-marriage of widows prescribed in the rules concerning marriage. This practice which is reprehended by the learned of the twice-born castes as fit for cattle is said (to have occurred) even among men, while Vena ruled. That chief of royal sages who formerly possessed the whole world, caused a confusion of the castes (varna), his intellect being destroyed by lust. Since that (time) the virtuous censure that (man) who in his folly appoints a woman, whose husband died, to (bear) children (to another man).”
Noticed long ago, by Hindu writers and by scholars
Georg Bühler translated Manu for the Sacred Books of the East in 1886. His note on verses 64-68 says they "flatly contradict" the rules before them. His introduction calls this a "famous instance of a contradiction": the appointment is "first permitted and next forbidden". Hindu writers saw it long before him. The Brihaspati Smriti says niyoga was declared by Manu, "and again prohibited by the same". Julius Jolly, who translated Brihaspati, says the conflict "had already struck" Brihaspati. So the charge does not come from outsiders. A law book that ranks Manu first records that he said both.
“These verses flatly contradict the rules given in the preceding ones. But it by no means follows that they are a modern addition. For the same view is expressed by Âp. II, 27, 2-6, and was held, according to Baudh. II, 3, 34, by Aupagandhani. Moreover the Brihaspati Smriti states expressly (Colebrooke IV, Dig. CLVII) that the contradictory statement occurred in the Mânava Dharmasâstra, known to its author.”
“Another famous instance of a contradiction, Manu IX, 58-70, where the appointment of a widow is first permitted and next forbidden, has probably to be explained in the same manner. If I here differ from Professor Jolly and others, who ascribe the prohibition to the remodeller of the Dharma-sûtra, and if I adhere to the view expressed by Brihaspati and some Indian commentators, my reasons are that, as the conflicting statements of the Dharma-sûtras show, the propriety of the Niyoga was not generally acknowledged even in ancient times, and that the medieval Nibandhakâras frequently follow the strange method of teaching adopted by Manu.”
“The Niyoga (appointment of a widow to raise offspring to her deceased lord) has been declared by Manu, and again prohibited by the same; on account of the successive deterioration of the (four) ages of the world, it must not be practised by mortals (in the present age) according to law. In the ages Krita, Tretâ, and Dvâpara, men were imbued with devotion and sacred knowledge; in the (present or) Kali age, a decrease of its power has been ordained for the human race. The various sons who were appointed by ancient sages cannot be adopted now by men of the present age, as they are destitute of power.”
“This text shows that the conflicting statements of Manu (IX, 57-68) with regard to the Niyoga, which have been the matter of so much comment among European philologists, had already struck his follower Brihaspati, and were ingeniously explained by him, in accordance with the practice of his own times.”
After the ban, the rule is used again
If verses 64-68 closed the matter, the rule would leave the book. It does not. Verse 120 divides an estate where a younger brother has fathered a son on the elder's wife. It adds, "thus the law is settled". Verse 145 says a son lawfully begotten on an appointed woman inherits like a son of the body. Verse 146 tells a man who has raised up a son for his dead brother to give that son the estate. Verse 159 places this son among the six heirs. Verse 167 defines him as the son born to the appointed wife "of a dead man, of a eunuch, or of one diseased". Verse 190 says a widow who raises up a son shall deliver the whole property to him. These are not rules for cleaning up after a wrong. Verses 143-144 refuse a share to a son begotten outside the rule, and verse 145 gives a full share to one begotten by it. So the book condemns the practice, then goes on giving it legal effect when it is done by the rule.
“If a younger brother begets a son on the wife of the elder, the division must then be made equally; thus the law is settled.”
“The son of a wife, not appointed (to have issue by another), and he whom (an appointed female, already) the mother of a son, bears to her brother-in-law, are both unworthy of a share, (one being) the son of an adulterer and (the other) produced through (mere) lust. Even the male (child) of a female (duly) appointed, not begotten according to the rule (given above), is unworthy of the paternal estate; for he was procreated by an outcast. A son (legally) begotten on such an appointed female shall inherit like a legitimate son of the body; for that seed and the produce belong, according to the law, to the owner of the soil. He who takes care of his deceased brother's estate and of his widow, shall, after raising up a son for his brother, give that property even to that (son). If a woman (duly) appointed bears a son to her brother-in-law or to another (Sapinda), that (son, if he is) begotten through desire, they declare (to be) incapable of inheriting and to be produced in vain.”
“The legitimate son of the body, the son begotten on a wife, the son adopted, the son made, the son secretly born, and the son cast off, (are) the six heirs and kinsmen.”
“He who was begotten according to the peculiar law (of the Niyoga) on the appointed wife of a dead man, of a eunuch, or of one diseased, is called a son begotten on a wife (Kshetraga).”
“(If the widow) of (a man) who died without leaving issue, raises up to him a son by a member of the family (Sagotra), she shall deliver to that (son) the whole property which belonged to the (deceased).”
- 9.59-63
Allowed
A woman with no son may be appointed, under rules.
- 9.64-68
Condemned
Those who do it “will violate the eternal law”.
- 9.120
Used again
An estate is divided for such a son: “thus the law is settled”.
- 9.143-147
Used again
A son begotten by the rule inherits. A son begotten outside it does not.
- 9.159, 9.167
Used again
This son is one of the six heirs. He is born to the appointed wife “of a dead man, of a eunuch, or of one diseased”.
- 9.190
Used again
The widow shall deliver the whole property to him.
Five answers, and the test they have to pass
Hindu writers tried to bring the two passages together. Scholars of every faith explain hard verses, Muslim scholars included. The fair test is whether the explanation fits the words. There are five main answers. The first says different ages: lawful long ago, forbidden now. This is Brihaspati's answer, and the Smritichandrika, a later law digest, agrees. The second says both stand, as a free choice. This is Medhatithi's answer. The third says different women: the rule covers a girl widowed after betrothal, and the ban covers a wife widowed after marriage. The Viramitrodaya, another digest, gives this answer. The fourth says Manu reports an old rule only to reject it. The Mitakshara, a commentary, treats verse 59 that way, and Bühler favours it. The fifth says emergency: the ban is the general rule, and niyoga the exception when a family has no son. Verse 56 calls this section the law for times of misfortune. The Balambhatti, a commentary on the Mitakshara, says the practice is allowed only in very abnormal circumstances. These answers cannot all be right. Medhatithi says the two passages cover the same case. The Parasharamadhava, a digest, says they must not be read as two alternatives. The Viramitrodaya takes "the widow" of verse 60 to be a betrothed girl. The Smritichandrika takes her to be a widow directed by her father-in-law. So centuries of study produced no single reading, and each answer fails on the book's own words.
“The Niyoga (appointment of a widow to raise offspring to her deceased lord) has been declared by Manu, and again prohibited by the same; on account of the successive deterioration of the (four) ages of the world, it must not be practised by mortals (in the present age) according to law. In the ages Krita, Tretâ, and Dvâpara, men were imbued with devotion and sacred knowledge; in the (present or) Kali age, a decrease of its power has been ordained for the human race. The various sons who were appointed by ancient sages cannot be adopted now by men of the present age, as they are destitute of power.”
“in Smṛtichandrikā (Samskāra, p. 226), which says that this prohibition is meant for the Kali-age;”
“For these reasons, just as the preceding sanction, so the subsequent prohibition also, should be taken as free from all limitations. And thus the sphere of application of both being the same, we must take the case as being one of option.”
“then it seeks to reconcile the apparent contradiction between verses 59 and 60 (permitting Niyoga) on the one hand, and verses 64-68 (forbidding it) on the other; the sanction is meant for the girl who is widowed after verbal betrothal, before marriage; while the prohibition applies to one who is widowed after marriage;”
“This verse is quoted in Mitākṣārā (2. 127) as propounding the practice of 'niyoga' for the purpose of forbidding it under verse 64 et seq.”
“Another famous instance of a contradiction, Manu IX, 58-70, where the appointment of a widow is first permitted and next forbidden, has probably to be explained in the same manner. If I here differ from Professor Jolly and others, who ascribe the prohibition to the remodeller of the Dharma-sûtra, and if I adhere to the view expressed by Brihaspati and some Indian commentators, my reasons are that, as the conflicting statements of the Dharma-sûtras show, the propriety of the Niyoga was not generally acknowledged even in ancient times, and that the medieval Nibandhakâras frequently follow the strange method of teaching adopted by Manu.”
“Thus the comparative importance of the seed and of the womb has been declared to you; I will next propound the law (applicable) to women in times of misfortune.”
“in Parāsharamādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 351), to the same effect; and it adds that for this reason the foregoing conflicting verses 59-68 should not be understood as setting forth two optional alternatives;”
“this means that the practice is sanctioned only under very abnormal circumstances”
“The widow, when directed by the father-in-law or other elders, may beget a desired (i.e., male) child from her husband's (elder or younger) brother,—but only one; although some people hold that she may secure two sons.”
| Answer | Fits “eternal law” in 9.64 | Fits the rules after the ban | Fits “wife” and “widow” |
|---|---|---|---|
| Different ages | |||
| A free choice | |||
| Different women | |||
| Reported, then rejected | |||
| An emergency exception |
- Fits
- Does not fit
Manu's own rule for sacred texts that clash
Manu knows that sacred texts can clash. It says that when two texts of revelation conflict, both are held to be law. Its example is the hour of a sacrifice, which may come after sunrise, before it, or when neither sun nor stars are seen. The worry is older than Manu's commentators. The Nirukta, an ancient work on Vedic words, records a teacher named Kautsa. He held that the Vedic stanzas have no meaning, and one of his reasons was that they contradict each other. One stanza says there was one Rudra and no second. Another speaks of Rudras in their thousands. Yaska, who wrote the Nirukta, rejected this and said everyday speech talks the same way. Even so, the charge is an ancient one inside the tradition. Manu's rule can settle a choice of hours. It cannot settle a practice the same book says violates the eternal law.
“But when two sacred texts (Sruti) are conflicting, both are held to be law; for both are pronounced by the wise (to be) valid law. (Thus) the (Agnihotra) sacrifice may be (optionally) performed, at any time after the sun has risen, before he has risen, or when neither sun nor stars are visible; that (is declared) by Vedic texts.”
“'If (the object of the science) is to ascertain the meaning of Vedic stanzas, it is useless,' says Kautsa, 'for the Vedic stanzas have no meaning'; this is to be established by the following arguments: propositions have their words fixed, their order, too, is immutably fixed. Further, the accomplishment of the ritual form is enjoined by the Brāhmaṇa, as 'Spread it wide', and so he spreads; 'Let me pour out', and so he pours out. Further, their meaning is impossible, as 'Save him, O plant!' and while striking, one declares, 'Do not injure him, O Axe!' Moreover, their meaning is contradictory, as 'There was but one Rudra and no second', and 'Rudras, who on earth are thousands without number'; 'O Indra! thou art born without a foe', and 'Indra vanquished hundred armies together'.”
“As to (the objection) that their meaning is contradictory, (we reply) that the same (objection) is applicable to the everyday speech of the world, as 'this Brāhmaṇa has no rival', 'this king has no enemies', &c. As to (the objection) that one enjoins a person who is already acquainted, (we reply) that in salutation a person announces his name to one who is already acquainted with it; the mixture of honey and milk is declared (to the guest) who is already acquainted with it. As to (the objection) that Aditi is everything, (we reply) that it is the same in the everyday speech of the world, as 'all fluids reside in water'. As to (the objection) that their meaning is obscure, (we reply) that it is not the fault of the post if the blind man does not see it; it is the fault of the man himself.”
Not one slip: the same pattern across the book
The widow passage is not alone. Bühler lists the book's "numerous contradictory passages" among the points scholars raise. Here are three pairs, each with the commentators' answer. First, verse 2.145 ranks the father and the mother above the teacher. Verse 2.146 calls the giver of the Veda "the more venerable father". Bühler says the commentators are "much perplexed". Medhatithi and Kulluka answer that the teacher of 2.145 only initiates the pupil and teaches him one verse, the Gayatri. Govindaraja and Narayana give a different answer. But verse 2.140 has just defined the same word: the teacher is the one who initiates a pupil and teaches him the Veda. Second, verse 3.51 forbids a father to take even the smallest payment for his daughter. Verses 9.98-100 call such a fee a sale. Yet 8.204 lets a man marry two girls "for the same price" and adds "that Manu ordained". Verse 9.97 rules on a fee already paid. A Hindu may answer that a law book can regulate a wrong without approving it. But 8.204 does not punish the sale. It gives the buyer both girls for his price. Bühler says such rules "presuppose the legality of the sale or purchase of a bride". Third, verse 9.124 ranks sons by their mothers and calls that "a settled rule". Verse 9.125 ranks them by birth. Bühler reports three different answers from the commentators. Medhatithi's answer is that the settled rule has no legal force. So chapter 9 is one case of a wider pattern, and a pattern cannot be put down to one copyist's slip.
“The points which have been brought forward in order to prove that the existing text of Manu has suffered many recasts are, first, its numerous contradictory passages;”
“The teacher (âkârya) is ten times more venerable than a sub-teacher (upâdhyâya), the father a hundred times more than the teacher, but the mother a thousand times more than the father. Of him who gives natural birth and him who gives (the knowledge of) the Veda, the giver of the Veda is the more venerable father; for the birth for the sake of the Veda (ensures) eternal (rewards) both in this (life) and after death.”
“In other cases the author is less explicit. He merely places conflicting opinions side by side without indicating that they belong to different authorities, and hence he has mostly succeeded in misleading the commentators as to his real meaning. Thus we read Manu II, 145, that the teacher is less venerable than the father and the mother, while the next following verses teach exactly the contrary doctrine. The commentators are much perplexed by this contradiction. But if we turn to Gautama II, 50-51, where it is said, 'The teacher is chief among all Gurus; some say (that) the mother (holds the first place),' it is not doubtful that the Manu-smriti gives in the first verse the opinion of Gautama's 'some' as the pûrvapaksha, and adduces the following one in order to prove its incorrectness.”
“The commentators try to reconcile the meaning of this verse and the next following one by assuming, either that the term âkârya refers in this case to one who merely performs the rite of initiation and teaches the Gâyatrî only (Medh., Kull.), or that the word 'father' denotes a father who initiates his own child and teaches it the Veda (Gov., Nâr.). But it is more probable that two conflicting opinions are here placed side by side, because both are based on an ancient tradition; see Gaut. II, 50-51.”
“They call that Brâhmana who initiates a pupil and teaches him the Veda together with the Kalpa and the Rahasyas, the teacher (âkârya, of the latter).”
“No father who knows (the law) must take even the smallest gratuity for his daughter; for a man who, through avarice, takes a gratuity, is a seller of his offspring. But those (male) relations who, in their folly, live on the separate property of women, (e. g. appropriate) the beasts of burden, carriages, and clothes of women, commit sin and will sink into hell.”
“Even a Sûdra ought not to take a nuptial fee, when he gives away his daughter; for he who takes a fee sells his daughter, covering (the transaction by another name). Neither ancients nor moderns who were good men have done such (a deed) that, after promising (a daughter) to one man, they gave her to another; Nor, indeed, have we heard, even in former creations, of such (a thing as) the covert sale of a daughter for a fixed price, called a nuptial fee.”
“If, after one damsel has been shown, another be given to the bridegroom, he may marry them both for the same price; that Manu ordained.”
“If, after the nuptial fee has been paid for a maiden, the giver of the fee dies, she shall be given in marriage to his brother, in case she consents.”
“our text in the third and ninth chapters violently inveighs against Âsura marriages, and in the eighth and ninth lays down rules which presuppose the legality of the sale or purchase of a bride”
“But the eldest (son, being) born of the eldest wife, shall receive fifteen cows and a bull, the other sons may then take shares according to (the seniority of) their mothers; that is a settled rule. Between sons born of wives equal (in caste) (and) without (any other) distinction no seniority in right of the mother exists; seniority is declared (to be) according to birth.”
“As this verse and the following one contradict the rules given in verses 123-124, the commentators try to reconcile them in various ways. Medh. thinks that verses 123-124 are an arthavâda and have no legal force, and Râgh. inclines to the same opinion. Nâr. and Nand. hold that the seniority according to the mother's marriage is of importance for the law of inheritance (verses 123-124), but that it has no value with respect to salutations and the like or to prerogatives at sacrifices (verses 125-126). Kull., finally relying on Gov.'s opinion, thinks that the rules leave an option, and that their application depends on the existence of good qualities and the want of such. It is, however, probable that, according to the custom of Hindu writers, the two conflicting opinions are placed side by side, and that it is intended that the learned should find their way out of the difficulty as they can.”
| Question | One place | Another place |
|---|---|---|
| Who ranks higher? | 2.145: the mother and father rank above the teacher | 2.146: the giver of the Veda is “the more venerable father” |
| May a father take a fee for his daughter? | 3.51 and 9.98: no, it is a sale | 8.204 and 9.97: rules for a price or a fee already paid |
| How are sons ranked? | 9.124: by their mothers, “a settled rule” | 9.125: “according to birth” |
What best explains the contradictions
Bühler does not leave the contradictions unexplained, and his explanation is telling. He gives two reasons. Indian authors often set conflicting opinions side by side, or mention old customs and then disapprove of them. And the book is a recast of an earlier work, which he says is "sufficient to account for contradictions". On 2.145 he thinks the book states one school's view and then answers it. But the book does not say so, and he says this has "mostly succeeded in misleading the commentators". On bride payment he supposes a writer who condemned the custom yet "was unwilling to expunge the rules". He explains the widow passage the same way, and calls it a "strange method of teaching". On 9.125 he says the learned must "find their way out of the difficulty as they can". These are human causes: rival schools, an older book reworked, rules kept by a writer who disliked them. They fit the evidence well. They do not fit a law said to come from the Creator and to rest on perfect knowledge. So the best scholarly explanation gives up the book's claim about itself.
“first, that it is a common habit of Indian authors to place conflicting opinions, supported by authorities of equal weight, side by side, and to allow an option, or to mention time-honoured rules, legal customs, and social institutions, and afterwards to disapprove of them; and secondly, that, as our Smriti is in any case a recast of an earlier Sûtra, that fact alone is sufficient to account for contradictions.”
“In other cases the author is less explicit. He merely places conflicting opinions side by side without indicating that they belong to different authorities, and hence he has mostly succeeded in misleading the commentators as to his real meaning. Thus we read Manu II, 145, that the teacher is less venerable than the father and the mother, while the next following verses teach exactly the contrary doctrine. The commentators are much perplexed by this contradiction. But if we turn to Gautama II, 50-51, where it is said, 'The teacher is chief among all Gurus; some say (that) the mother (holds the first place),' it is not doubtful that the Manu-smriti gives in the first verse the opinion of Gautama's 'some' as the pûrvapaksha, and adduces the following one in order to prove its incorrectness.”
“Similarly, the supposition that the author of the Mânava Dharma-sûtra, though condemning Âsura marriages, was unwilling to expunge the rules regulating the sale, is not at all improbable.”
“Another famous instance of a contradiction, Manu IX, 58-70, where the appointment of a widow is first permitted and next forbidden, has probably to be explained in the same manner. If I here differ from Professor Jolly and others, who ascribe the prohibition to the remodeller of the Dharma-sûtra, and if I adhere to the view expressed by Brihaspati and some Indian commentators, my reasons are that, as the conflicting statements of the Dharma-sûtras show, the propriety of the Niyoga was not generally acknowledged even in ancient times, and that the medieval Nibandhakâras frequently follow the strange method of teaching adopted by Manu.”
“As this verse and the following one contradict the rules given in verses 123-124, the commentators try to reconcile them in various ways. Medh. thinks that verses 123-124 are an arthavâda and have no legal force, and Râgh. inclines to the same opinion. Nâr. and Nand. hold that the seniority according to the mother's marriage is of importance for the law of inheritance (verses 123-124), but that it has no value with respect to salutations and the like or to prerogatives at sacrifices (verses 125-126). Kull., finally relying on Gov.'s opinion, thinks that the rules leave an option, and that their application depends on the existence of good qualities and the want of such. It is, however, probable that, according to the custom of Hindu writers, the two conflicting opinions are placed side by side, and that it is intended that the learned should find their way out of the difficulty as they can.”
“But he having composed these Institutes (of the sacred law), himself taught them, according to the rule, to me alone in the beginning; next I (taught them) to Marîki and the other sages.”
“Whatever law has been ordained for any (person) by Manu, that has been fully declared in the Veda: for that (sage was) omniscient.”
The test the Qur'an sets for itself
The Qur'an sets the test itself. It tells readers to consider it with care, and says that a book from anyone other than God (﷾) would hold much discrepancy. It says God (﷾) allowed no crookedness in it. So a reader need not take its origin on trust. The site's page on contradictions in the Qur'an goes through the objections one by one. On a widow and her husband's family, the Qur'an gives one plain ruling. Before Islam, a dead man's relatives could claim his widow. The Qur'an forbade men to "inherit women against their will", and no verse brings that claim back. Islam's answer is one God and one Book you can test for yourself. Read it with the care it asks for, and see whether it passes.
“Do they not consider the Qur'an (with care)? Had it been from other Than Allah, they would surely have found therein Much discrepancy.”
“Praise be to Allah, Who hath sent to His Servant the Book, and hath allowed therein no Crookedness:”
“O ye who believe! Ye are forbidden to inherit women against their will. Nor should ye treat them with harshness, that ye may Take away part of the dower ye have given them,-except where they have been guilty of open lewdness; on the contrary live with them on a footing of kindness and equity. If ye take a dislike to them it may be that ye dislike a thing, and Allah brings about through it a great deal of good.”
Ibn Abbas explains that before Qur'an 4:19 was revealed, when a man died his relatives had the right to inherit his widow. One of them could marry her, or they could marry her off, or keep her from marrying at all, and they had more say over her than her own family. The verse was revealed to end this.
Verse by verse
Brihaspati Smriti 24.12-14 — chapter 24, verses 12-14
“The Niyoga (appointment of a widow to raise offspring to her deceased lord) has been declared by Manu, and again prohibited by the same; on account of the successive deterioration of the (four) ages of the world, it must not be practised by mortals (in the present age) according to law. In the ages Krita, Tretâ, and Dvâpara, men were imbued with devotion and sacred knowledge; in the (present or) Kali age, a decrease of its power has been ordained for the human race. The various sons who were appointed by ancient sages cannot be adopted now by men of the present age, as they are destitute of power.”
Cited for
Different ages. Niyoga was lawful in the earlier ages, when people had more power. It is forbidden only in the present Kali age. Manu 1.85 itself says that duties differ from age to age.
The response
Manu 1.85 does say that, so the reply has a real basis. But verses 59-63 name no age. Verse 64 does not call the practice unfit for today. It says the practice violates the eternal law, and a law that lasts for only some ages is not eternal. Verses 66-68 give the history too. Verse 66 places the practice among men in the reign of Vena, whom Medhatithi calls the first king. Verse 68 says the virtuous have censured it since that time. On Manu's own account, that leaves no age in which it stood approved. Bühler adds that its propriety "was not generally acknowledged even in ancient times". And verse 120 still says "thus the law is settled".
Where it lands — Brihaspati's answer is about his own times. Manu's words say something else.
Medhatithi, commentary on Manusmriti 9.64 — Ganganatha Jha, vol. 5, p. 49
“For these reasons, just as the preceding sanction, so the subsequent prohibition also, should be taken as free from all limitations. And thus the sphere of application of both being the same, we must take the case as being one of option.”
Cited for
A free choice. The rule and the ban cover the same case, so both stand as an option, as Manu 2.14 says of clashing sacred texts.
The response
An option works between two lawful ways, such as two hours for one sacrifice. Here one side is called a violation of the eternal law. Medhatithi sees the problem. He says the man who uses the practice for its benefits "would be transgressing the prohibition". A choice in which one side breaks the eternal law is not a free choice. The Parasharamadhava also refuses this reading.
Where it lands — Calling the two passages an option admits that they cover the same case, and leaves the clash in place.
Jha's note on Manusmriti 9.64 — Manu-Smriti: Notes, part 2, p. 656
“then it seeks to reconcile the apparent contradiction between verses 59 and 60 (permitting Niyoga) on the one hand, and verses 64-68 (forbidding it) on the other; the sanction is meant for the girl who is widowed after verbal betrothal, before marriage; while the prohibition applies to one who is widowed after marriage;”
Cited for
Different women. The rule is for a girl whose betrothed died before the wedding, as in verse 69. The ban is for a wife widowed after marriage. Some add that such a rule is for Shudra women only, a view the commentator Narayana reports on verse 190.
The response
Verses 69-70 do give a rule for the betrothed girl, but as a separate rule, after the ban. Verses 59-63 speak of a woman whose husband left no son, and of "the widow". Verse 120 says "the wife of the elder". Verse 143 speaks of an appointed woman who is already "the mother of a son". Verse 146 speaks of a dead brother's estate "and of his widow". Verse 167 names the appointed wife "of a eunuch, or of one diseased", and such a wife is no betrothed girl. Medhatithi says the lack of issue can mean a son who was born and died, so she was a wife and a mother. He also says both passages are "free from all limitations". A later commentary, the Balambhatti, concludes that the sanction must refer to "a regular widow". As for caste, verse 59 names none.
Where it lands — The book's own words speak of wives and mothers, so the rule cannot be limited to betrothed girls.
Manusmriti 9.56 — chapter 9, verse 56
“Thus the comparative importance of the seed and of the womb has been declared to you; I will next propound the law (applicable) to women in times of misfortune.”
Cited for
An emergency rule. Verse 56 calls this section the law for times of misfortune, and Medhatithi says the lack of a son is that distress. The Balambhatti says the practice is allowed only in very abnormal circumstances. So the ban is the general rule, and niyoga is the exception for a family with no son.
The response
Manu does call it a law for misfortune. But an exception needs a general rule to stand apart from. A widow is appointed to bear a son because there is no son, so the emergency is the very case the ban speaks of. Verse 68 censures the man who appoints a widow "to (bear) children", and it names no exception. Verse 64 calls this a violation of the eternal law. Medhatithi says the two passages cover the same case. An eternal law does not give way in the very case it speaks of.
Where it lands — The ban speaks of the same case as the rule, so that case cannot be its exception.
Qur'an 2:106 — Surat al-Baqara (The Cow), verse 106
“None of Our revelations do We abrogate or cause to be forgotten, but We substitute something better or similar: Knowest thou not that Allah Hath power over all things?”
Cited for
The Qur'an has abrogation. It replaces its own rulings, so Muslims cannot fault Manu for doing the same.
The response
Abrogation means God (﷾) replaced one ruling with a later one, and the Qur'an says so openly. The later ruling then stands, and the earlier one never returns. Prayer once faced Jerusalem, then the Kaaba. The Qur'an never calls the first direction a sin, and it says "never would Allah Make your faith of no effect". The ban on wine came in steps, and every step went the same way. The first step already said that its sin is greater than its profit. Manu goes yes, then no, then yes. It gives the rule as law. Then it calls the same rule a violation of the eternal law, fit for cattle. Neither passage says it replaces the other. Then the book uses the rule again and says "thus the law is settled". The site's page on abrogation explains the Qur'an's cases.
Where it lands — A ruling replaced once, openly, is a plan carried out. A rule allowed, condemned and then used again is a contradiction.
| Question | The Qur'an: the direction of prayer | Manu: the appointed widow |
|---|---|---|
| Is the old rule condemned? | No. The Qur'an says earlier faith was not lost. | Yes. It calls it a practice fit for cattle. |
| Is the change stated openly? | Yes. The Qur'an says revelations are replaced. | No. Neither passage says it replaces the other. |
| Does the old rule come back? | No. Prayer turned to the Kaaba. | Yes. Later verses use it as law. |
Perspectives
Common Hindu replies
Manu is an ancient law book, read through its commentators. It records old customs and the views of earlier teachers, and later hands touched it. It is smriti, so it stands below the Veda, and many Hindus today do not treat it as binding. A clash of verses in such a book says nothing against the Hindu faith.
Modern Hindus and readers of the classical commentators
Manu is only reporting an old custom before rejecting it. Bühler says Indian authors often mention old rules and afterwards disapprove of them.
Rebuttal
The book knows how to mark a reported view: verse 61 says "Some (sages)" think otherwise. Verse 59 has no such mark, and Medhatithi says it "enjoins the practice". A rule merely reported would then stay rejected. Here the book returns to it after the ban and says "thus the law is settled". It gives a full share to a son begotten by the rule and refuses one to a son begotten outside it.
The ban, or the rule, was added later. The Manusmriti has been altered, so its clashes tell us nothing about the original.
Rebuttal
Bühler says it "by no means follows" that the ban is a modern addition, because the Brihaspati Smriti already knew both statements. And this reply changes the question without answering it. If later hands put a condemnation of the rule into the book without marking it, then no reader can tell which verses came from Manu. The site's page on whether the Vedas were preserved looks at later hands in the law books.
The Manusmriti is smriti, not revelation. Hindus are not bound by it, so its contradictions do not touch the faith.
Rebuttal
It is true that smriti ranks below the Veda, and many Hindus today do not follow Manu. But the book says it must never be called into question. Brihaspati gives it the first rank, and Shankara, a Hindu teacher of about the 8th century, calls Manu the one "who follows the Veda". So setting it aside means the tradition's own measure failed. Someone must then decide which of the holy books to keep. If that is the reader's own judgement, the judgement has taken the place of revelation. And Manu's own rule for clashing texts concerns the Veda, so the question does not stop at the law books.
The Islamic perspective
A book from God (﷾) does not disagree with itself. The Qur'an sets that test for itself. Where a ruling was replaced, the Qur'an says so openly, the later ruling stands, and the earlier one never returns.
The Qur'an says that a book from anyone other than God (﷾) would hold much discrepancy.
The Qur'an says God (﷾) allowed no crookedness in it.
The Qur'an forbids inheriting women against their will. Ibn Abbas explains that the verse ended the claim of a dead man's relatives over his widow.