Short answer
Yes. Emptiness does not mean that nothing exists, or that nothing is true. The Buddhist teacher Nagarjuna meant that nothing stands by itself: each thing depends on others. He taught that things are true in the everyday way, and that his own teaching is true in that way too. So a careful Buddhist also says that some things are true. The question is what truth rests on. If every truth rests on convention alone, then nothing beyond convention makes this teaching true, or makes cruelty wrong. The Qur'an agrees that created things depend and pass away. But it says what they depend on. God (﷾) alone is the Real. He needs nothing, and all creation needs Him. So truth, and right and wrong, have a ground that does not pass away.
Full explanation
What emptiness means
Emptiness (sunyata) does not mean that nothing exists. It means that nothing exists by itself. The word is old. In the Pali texts the Buddha calls the world empty because it is empty of self. Mahayana sutras go further and call all things empty. The Heart Sutra, a short Mahayana sutra, says that form is emptiness and emptiness is form, and that all things have the character of emptiness.
Nagarjuna was an Indian teacher of about 150 to 250 CE, and he founded the Madhyamaka (Middle Way) school. He says what this means. Things are empty of svabhava (own-being), a nature that a thing would have from itself alone. Nothing has one, because everything arises in dependence on other things. A flame needs fuel and air. A table needs wood and a maker. Nagarjuna says that dependent arising is what he calls emptiness. So emptiness is a claim about how things exist, not about whether they exist.
“Ānanda, they say that ‘the world is empty’ because it’s empty of self or what belongs to self.”
“form here is emptiness, and emptiness indeed is form. Emptiness is not different from form, form is not different from emptiness. What is form that is emptiness, what is emptiness that is form.”
“Here, O Sariputra, all things have the character of emptiness, they have no beginning, no end, they are faultless and not faultless, they are not imperfect and not perfect.”
Westerhoff dates Nagarjuna to about 150-250 CE and writes of the Middle Way (madhyamaka) philosophy that he founded in the second century. He writes that Madhyamaka thinkers are clear that their position avoids both belief in own-being and its opposite extreme, the view that nothing exists. The refutation of own-being goes step by step, one opponent's candidate at a time, and no single argument settles the matter. On the Madhyamaka view of truth, he writes, there can be no ultimate truth in the sense of a theory of how things really are apart from our concepts, and all that is left is conventional truth. Emptiness, he writes, is not to be taken as a description of reality apart from human conventions: its main purpose is to combat the wrong ascription of own-being to things. He also writes that Nagarjuna denies any ontological foundation.
Nagarjuna says that dependent arising is what he calls emptiness. He adds that emptiness is itself a dependent designation, and that this is the middle path.
Nagarjuna says that the dependent being of things is what is called emptiness. In his own comment he adds that carts, cloths and pots are empty of own-being because they arise dependently, yet they do their work: they carry wood and earth, hold honey, water and milk, and protect from cold, wind and heat. In the same way, he says, his statement arises dependently and has no own-being, yet it does its work of showing that things have no own-being.
Empty does not mean nothing
Nagarjuna rejects the idea that nothing exists. In a Pali discourse the Buddha calls "All exists" one extreme and "All does not exist" the other, and he teaches by the middle way. Nagarjuna names that same teaching with approval. He also warns that emptiness wrongly seen destroys a person, like a snake seized the wrong way. The Madhyamaka school says that it avoids both extremes.
Nor is emptiness a hidden something behind the world. Nagarjuna calls emptiness itself a name given in dependence, and later teachers of his school say that emptiness is empty too. So Madhyamaka puts no ground under the world, and it holds that none is needed. That matters for this page: it does not say that Buddhists think nothing is real. The real question is harder, and Nagarjuna faced it himself.
“‘All exists’: this is one extreme. ‘All does not exist’: this is the second extreme. Avoiding these two extremes, the Realized One teaches by the middle way:”
Nagarjuna says that in the instruction to Katyayana (Kaccana) the Blessed One rejected both "it is" and "it is not".
Nagarjuna warns that emptiness wrongly seen destroys a person of weak understanding, like a snake wrongly seized or a spell wrongly cast.
Westerhoff dates Nagarjuna to about 150-250 CE and writes of the Middle Way (madhyamaka) philosophy that he founded in the second century. He writes that Madhyamaka thinkers are clear that their position avoids both belief in own-being and its opposite extreme, the view that nothing exists. The refutation of own-being goes step by step, one opponent's candidate at a time, and no single argument settles the matter. On the Madhyamaka view of truth, he writes, there can be no ultimate truth in the sense of a theory of how things really are apart from our concepts, and all that is left is conventional truth. Emptiness, he writes, is not to be taken as a description of reality apart from human conventions: its main purpose is to combat the wrong ascription of own-being to things. He also writes that Nagarjuna denies any ontological foundation.
Nagarjuna says that dependent arising is what he calls emptiness. He adds that emptiness is itself a dependent designation, and that this is the middle path.
Thakchoe writes that for Candrakirti (about 600-650 CE) everyday knowing is of two kinds. Knowing by sound senses is reliable by the world's own standard. Knowing by faulty senses is deceptive even by that standard. He writes that in this school the ultimate truth, emptiness, is itself empty, and that ordinary people reach it by reasoned analysis.
The two truths
Nagarjuna says the Buddhas teach by two truths. Conventional truth is the truth of daily life and language. Fire burns, and a seed grows into a plant. Ultimate truth is how things stand when they are examined to the end: nothing is found that has own-being. Each truth needs the other. Without everyday speech the ultimate cannot be taught. Without the ultimate, nirvana is not reached.
Conventional does not mean that anything goes. Candrakirti taught in this school in the 7th century. He says that sound senses are reliable by the world's own standard, and faulty senses are not. So within daily life a claim can still be right or wrong.
This explains hard lines in the sutras. The Heart Sutra says that in emptiness there are not even the four truths, the Buddha's teaching on suffering and its end. It does not cancel that teaching in daily life. It says that even the teaching has no own-being. So a Mahayana Buddhist has a real answer to the question on this page: things are true in two ways. That answer deserves to be tested, not brushed aside.
Nagarjuna says the Buddhas teach by relying on two truths: the truth of the world's conventions and the truth in the ultimate sense. Those who do not know the difference between them do not know the deep truth of the Buddha's teaching. Without relying on everyday usage the ultimate cannot be taught, and without coming to the ultimate, nirvana is not reached.
Thakchoe writes that for Candrakirti (about 600-650 CE) everyday knowing is of two kinds. Knowing by sound senses is reliable by the world's own standard. Knowing by faulty senses is deceptive even by that standard. He writes that in this school the ultimate truth, emptiness, is itself empty, and that ordinary people reach it by reasoned analysis.
“there are not (the four truths, viz. that there) is pain, origin of pain, stoppage of pain, and the path to it. There is no knowledge, no obtaining (of Nirvana).”
| Point | Conventional truth | Ultimate truth |
|---|---|---|
| What it is | The truth of daily life and language | How things stand when examined to the end |
| Example | Fire burns | Nothing is found that has own-being |
| Its job | Without it the ultimate cannot be taught | Without it nirvana is not reached |
| How it is tested | By sound senses, on the world's own standard | By examining things to the end |
Nagarjuna's own answer: the words are empty too
The obvious question is an old one, and Nagarjuna states it himself in the Vigrahavyavartani (The Dispeller of Disputes). If your statement has no own-being, how can it deny anything? And if it does have own-being, then not all things are empty.
He gives three replies. First, his words are empty, and they still work. A cart, a cloth and a pot are empty too, yet they carry wood, keep out the cold and hold honey. Second, one empty thing can stop another, as one magically made man can stop another. So empty words can remove a false belief. Third, he says he has no thesis, no claim put up to be proved, so the fault cannot fall on him.
The third reply is easy to misread, and scholars read it in two ways. On one reading he puts forward no view of his own. He only shows the faults in other views, until those who hold them let go. He does say that emptiness is the way out of all views, and that those who make it one more view are incurable. On the other reading he has no thesis that stands by itself. His books are full of claims, and he says that he speaks by accepting everyday usage. So "all things are empty" is a real claim. But it is true in the everyday way, as "fire burns" is true. No statement, his own included, is made true by a world that stands apart from all convention.
He ends the book with a strong claim of his own. For anyone for whom emptiness holds, he says, everything holds: the Buddha's path, right and wrong, and all daily dealings. So he offers emptiness as what makes the world work, not as what undoes it.
Nagarjuna sets out the objection. If nothing has own-being, your own statement has none, and it cannot deny own-being. But if your statement does have own-being, your first claim is lost, and you must explain why it alone is different.
Nagarjuna says that the dependent being of things is what is called emptiness. In his own comment he adds that carts, cloths and pots are empty of own-being because they arise dependently, yet they do their work: they carry wood and earth, hold honey, water and milk, and protect from cold, wind and heat. In the same way, he says, his statement arises dependently and has no own-being, yet it does its work of showing that things have no own-being.
Nagarjuna compares his denial to a magically made man stopping another magically made man. Both are empty, and yet the one stops the other. So his empty words can stop the belief in own-being.
“When I have theses (of my own to prove), I can commit mistakes just for the sake (of proving) But I have none. I cannot be accused (Of being inconsistent).”
In his own comment on verse 29 Nagarjuna gives his reason. When all things are empty, wholly at peace and by nature free of own-being, from where could a thesis come?
Hayes writes that Candrakirti took Nagarjuna's line to mean that the Madhyamaka puts forward no counter-position against the claims of other philosophers. He shows the problems in their positions and argues only until they see that those positions fail.
Nagarjuna says the Victors taught emptiness as the way out of all views. Those who turn emptiness into a view, they called incurable.
Westerhoff writes that verse 29 does not claim that Nagarjuna asserts no thesis whatsoever, since his works are full of philosophical theses. Nagarjuna means that none of his theses exists substantially: none is made true by a ready-made world that stands apart from the mind. The thesis that all things are empty is itself empty, and it is true in the same convention-based way as every other statement. Westerhoff puts the opponent's charge as a comparison: such a thesis is like money won in a board game, which buys nothing outside the game. Nagarjuna's reply, he writes, is to deny that any statement is of the other kind. He compares this with a relativist who holds that all truths are relative, and says the question then becomes why this truth rather than another should be adopted, a question he says faces every statement on such a view.
Nagarjuna says his statement has no own-being, so his position is not lost. In his comment he adds that his statement is empty as all other things are empty, so there is no inconsistency; there would be one only if he said that his statement alone was not empty (24). He also says that he does not speak without accepting everyday usage (28).
Nagarjuna ends the work by saying that for the one for whom emptiness holds, all things hold, and for the one for whom it does not hold, nothing holds. His comment lists what holds for such a person: dependent arising, the four noble truths, right and wrong with their causes and their results, and all everyday dealings.
What makes the teaching true?
Grant what is sound here. A statement does not need own-being to do a job. So the quick charge that emptiness refutes itself does not settle the matter. But ask what makes the teaching true.
Take the first reading. If Nagarjuna claims nothing and only removes other views, then emptiness says nothing about what exists. So it cannot show that there is no One who stands by Himself. And working is not the same as being true. A false rumour also works: it moves a crowd.
Take the second reading, which is the stronger one. "All things are empty" is a real claim, and it is true by convention, as every truth is. One scholar of Madhyamaka puts the old objection as a picture. Such a claim is like money won in a board game: it buys houses in the game and nothing outside it. Nagarjuna's reply is that there is no money outside the game. No statement is true in any other way.
But that reply is itself a claim about every statement, in every time and place. Ask what makes it true. If it holds whatever people accept, then one truth does not rest on convention, and the rule has an exception. If it holds only inside a convention, then nothing beyond convention makes it true. The same scholar grants that the question then becomes why this truth should be adopted and not another. He says that question faces every statement on such a view. That is the cost of the view. It can say that the teaching works. It cannot say that this is how things are, apart from what people accept.
The Pali texts speak in another way. There the Buddha says that the law of conditions persists "Whether Realized Ones arise or not". A Realized One, a Buddha, awakens to it. That is a truth found, not a truth agreed. So these texts treat it as a truth that does not wait for people.
The method has a limit too. Madhyamaka works case by case, taking up each claim to own-being in turn. Its best-known arguments ask how things arise: from themselves, from another, from both, or from no cause. That can show that each thing examined falls short. It does not show that there can be no One who never arose. Indian critics, Brahmin and Buddhist, were not satisfied by the no-thesis reply either. So emptiness can clear away false views, but it cannot by itself tell a seeker what is true.
Nagarjuna says that the dependent being of things is what is called emptiness. In his own comment he adds that carts, cloths and pots are empty of own-being because they arise dependently, yet they do their work: they carry wood and earth, hold honey, water and milk, and protect from cold, wind and heat. In the same way, he says, his statement arises dependently and has no own-being, yet it does its work of showing that things have no own-being.
“When I have theses (of my own to prove), I can commit mistakes just for the sake (of proving) But I have none. I cannot be accused (Of being inconsistent).”
Hayes writes that Candrakirti took Nagarjuna's line to mean that the Madhyamaka puts forward no counter-position against the claims of other philosophers. He shows the problems in their positions and argues only until they see that those positions fail.
Westerhoff writes that verse 29 does not claim that Nagarjuna asserts no thesis whatsoever, since his works are full of philosophical theses. Nagarjuna means that none of his theses exists substantially: none is made true by a ready-made world that stands apart from the mind. The thesis that all things are empty is itself empty, and it is true in the same convention-based way as every other statement. Westerhoff puts the opponent's charge as a comparison: such a thesis is like money won in a board game, which buys nothing outside the game. Nagarjuna's reply, he writes, is to deny that any statement is of the other kind. He compares this with a relativist who holds that all truths are relative, and says the question then becomes why this truth rather than another should be adopted, a question he says faces every statement on such a view.
“Whether Realized Ones arise or not, this law of nature persists, this regularity of natural principles, this surety of natural principles, specific conditionality. A Realized One awakens to this and comprehends it, then he explains, teaches, asserts, establishes, clarifies, analyzes, and discloses it.”
Westerhoff dates Nagarjuna to about 150-250 CE and writes of the Middle Way (madhyamaka) philosophy that he founded in the second century. He writes that Madhyamaka thinkers are clear that their position avoids both belief in own-being and its opposite extreme, the view that nothing exists. The refutation of own-being goes step by step, one opponent's candidate at a time, and no single argument settles the matter. On the Madhyamaka view of truth, he writes, there can be no ultimate truth in the sense of a theory of how things really are apart from our concepts, and all that is left is conventional truth. Emptiness, he writes, is not to be taken as a description of reality apart from human conventions: its main purpose is to combat the wrong ascription of own-being to things. He also writes that Nagarjuna denies any ontological foundation.
Nagarjuna says that no thing anywhere ever arises from itself, from another, from both, or without a cause.
Berger writes that the Brahmin logicians charged the claim "all things are empty" with refuting itself. He writes that Nagarjuna's reply that he asserts no thesis satisfied no one in the Indian tradition, Brahmin or Buddhist, apart from his two major commentators four centuries later.
Empty things can do a jobA cart carries wood and a pot holds honey.
Empty words can stop a false beliefOne magically made man can stop another.
The words are trueA false rumour also does a job.
There is no One who stands by HimselfHis arguments ask how things arise. God (﷾) does not arise.
| Reading | What it means | What follows |
|---|---|---|
| He puts forward no view | He only shows the faults in other views | Emptiness says nothing about what exists, so it cannot rule out a Creator |
| He has no thesis that stands by itself | "All things are empty" is a real claim, true by convention as every truth is | Nothing beyond convention makes it true |
Nagarjuna on right and wrong
Nagarjuna turns the charge around. If good things had a fixed own-being, he says, there would be no spiritual life, no right and no wrong, and no ordinary daily dealings. Own-being cannot be made, so no one could ever do right or wrong. In his view it is emptiness that lets a person change. Where emptiness holds, he says, right and wrong hold with their results.
Buddhist teachers add two more grounds. The first is karma: the Pali texts say that beings are heirs to their deeds. The second is compassion. Shantideva, an Indian teacher who lived between the late 7th and the mid-8th century, says that pain has no owner. All pain is to be stopped, simply because it is pain. So Buddhists do not say that emptiness frees anyone from morality, and this page does not say it of them.
Nagarjuna says that if good things had their own-being without depending on anything, there would be no living of the spiritual life. There would be neither right nor wrong, and no ordinary daily dealings. All things would be eternal, for what has no cause is eternal.
Nagarjuna says that if things were not empty, no one would ever do right or wrong. What could be done to what is not empty? Own-being is not something that is made.
Nagarjuna ends the work by saying that for the one for whom emptiness holds, all things hold, and for the one for whom it does not hold, nothing holds. His comment lists what holds for such a person: dependent arising, the four noble truths, right and wrong with their causes and their results, and all everyday dealings.
“Student, sentient beings are the owners of their deeds and heir to their deeds.”
Shantideva says that pains have no owner and are all alike. They are to be warded off simply because they are pain, so why set any limit?
Goodman dates Shantideva from the late 7th to the mid-8th century CE. He writes that Shantideva's argument from the absence of any self to care for all beings, now called the Ownerless Suffering Argument, became a major topic of discussion largely through the criticisms of the scholar Paul Williams, and that it still has both critics and defenders.
What makes cruelty really wrong?
Nagarjuna's argument removes one idea: that goodness sits inside a deed as a fixed nature. It does not put another ground in its place. Under the two truths, "cruelty is wrong" is a conventional truth. Conventions can be tested, as Candrakirti says. But the tests belong to the convention too. If a whole people accepted a cruelty, nothing beyond convention could call it wrong.
A Buddhist may reply that cruelty causes pain, and that by karma the cruel person will suffer for it. Both replies say what cruelty does. Neither says why it ought not to be done. Karma makes cruelty unwise for the one who does it, as fire makes it unwise to touch a flame. That is not the same as making it wrong. Shantideva's verse says that all pain is to be stopped, but it does not say what makes that a duty. Scholars of Buddhism still argue over whether his argument works.
At the ultimate level the sutras go further. In the Diamond Sutra a bodhisattva is one who seeks awakening for all beings. He resolves to deliver them all, and yet not one being has been delivered. The sutra gives its reason: a bodhisattva must hold no idea of a being. Nagarjuna finds no difference at all between nirvana and samsara, the round of rebirth. These lines are not meant to stop anyone helping. But they leave the duty to help resting on convention, and on nothing else.
This is not only a Muslim's question. A group of scholars of Buddhism, the Cowherds, wrote a book on it. It asks whether moral rules can bind at all if everything is only conventionally real. Its essays try several answers, and they treat the problem as real. The kindness of Buddhists is not in doubt. The question is what makes kindness a duty.
Nagarjuna says the Buddhas teach by relying on two truths: the truth of the world's conventions and the truth in the ultimate sense. Those who do not know the difference between them do not know the deep truth of the Buddha's teaching. Without relying on everyday usage the ultimate cannot be taught, and without coming to the ultimate, nirvana is not reached.
Thakchoe writes that for Candrakirti (about 600-650 CE) everyday knowing is of two kinds. Knowing by sound senses is reliable by the world's own standard. Knowing by faulty senses is deceptive even by that standard. He writes that in this school the ultimate truth, emptiness, is itself empty, and that ordinary people reach it by reasoned analysis.
“Student, sentient beings are the owners of their deeds and heir to their deeds.”
Shantideva says that pains have no owner and are all alike. They are to be warded off simply because they are pain, so why set any limit?
Goodman dates Shantideva from the late 7th to the mid-8th century CE. He writes that Shantideva's argument from the absence of any self to care for all beings, now called the Ownerless Suffering Argument, became a major topic of discussion largely through the criticisms of the scholar Paul Williams, and that it still has both critics and defenders.
“And yet, after I have thus delivered immeasurable beings, not one single being has been delivered.”
“There is no difference at all Between Nirvana and Samsara. There is no difference at all Between Samsara and Nirvana.”
A collective of scholars of Buddhism takes up what the publisher calls an important problem. If all things, persons and actions included, are only conventionally real, can moral rules bind, or does relativism follow? The essays try several ways of making sense of the real force of morality within Madhyamaka. The publisher adds that the same scholars, in their earlier book Moonshadows, argue that Madhyamaka can give a robust account of truth and knowledge within conventional reality.
Where the Qur'an agrees
The Qur'an agrees that nothing created stands by itself. All that is on earth will perish, and the Face of your Lord abides. People have need of God (﷾), and He has need of no one. The Prophet (ﷺ) said that the truest line a poet ever spoke is that everything except Allah (﷾) is perishable.
Abraham (pbuh) reasoned with his people about a star, the moon and the sun. Each one set, and of the star he said, "I love not those that set." He saw what a Buddhist sees: these things pass. But he took one step more. He turned his face to the One who created them. So the dispute is not over whether created things depend and pass. It is over what they depend on.
Islam does not say the world is unreal. It is real, but it has its being from God (﷾), not from itself. He created the heavens and the earth for just ends, not in sport. And the world is not God, for there is nothing like Him.
“All that is on earth will perish: But will abide (for ever) the Face of thy Lord,- full of Majesty, Bounty and Honour.”
“O ye men! It is ye that have need of Allah: but Allah is the One Free of all wants, worthy of all praise.”
Abu Hurayra reports that the Prophet (ﷺ) said the truest line a poet ever spoke is this: everything except Allah (﷾) is perishable.
“When the night covered him over, He saw a star: He said: "This is my Lord." But when it set, He said: "I love not those that set." When he saw the moon rising in splendour, he said: "This is my Lord." But when the moon set, He said: "unless my Lord guide me, I shall surely be among those who go astray." When he saw the sun rising in splendour, he said: "This is my Lord; this is the greatest (of all)." But when the sun set, he said: "O my people! I am indeed free from your (guilt) of giving partners to Allah. "For me, I have set my face, firmly and truly, towards Him Who created the heavens and the earth, and never shall I give partners to Allah."”
“We created not the heavens, the earth, and all between them, merely in (idle) sport: We created them not except for just ends: but most of them do not understand.”
“(He is) the Creator of the heavens and the earth: He has made for you pairs from among yourselves, and pairs among cattle: by this means does He multiply you: there is nothing whatever like unto Him, and He is the One that hears and sees (all things).”
| Point | Madhyamaka | The Qur'an |
|---|---|---|
| Created things depend on others | Yes | Yes |
| Created things pass away | Yes | Yes |
| Something stands by itself | No: there is no final ground | Yes: God (﷾), the Living, the Self-subsisting |
The One who stands by Himself
Dependence raises a question. If each thing depends on another, what do they all depend on? Madhyamaka says there is no final ground. The Qur'an says there is. It calls Allah (﷾) the Living, the Self-subsisting: He stands by Himself. He does not beget and He is not begotten. He is not one more link in the chain, for all the links need Him, and He needs none of them.
Nagarjuna's arguments turn on arising and dependence, in things such as seeds, flames and carts. They show that such things cannot have own-being. God (﷾) does not arise. So those arguments do not reach Him.
Shantideva presses one more point. A Lord who depends on nothing, he says, would have to create always, and a Lord who acts by wishing depends on his wish. But a will is not a need. A need comes from a lack, and God (﷾) is free of all wants. When He intends a thing, He says "be", and it is. So the One who stands by Himself can still act, and nothing outside Him makes Him act. The page "Who created God?" sets out why a chain of dependent things needs a Maker who is not dependent.
Westerhoff dates Nagarjuna to about 150-250 CE and writes of the Middle Way (madhyamaka) philosophy that he founded in the second century. He writes that Madhyamaka thinkers are clear that their position avoids both belief in own-being and its opposite extreme, the view that nothing exists. The refutation of own-being goes step by step, one opponent's candidate at a time, and no single argument settles the matter. On the Madhyamaka view of truth, he writes, there can be no ultimate truth in the sense of a theory of how things really are apart from our concepts, and all that is left is conventional truth. Emptiness, he writes, is not to be taken as a description of reality apart from human conventions: its main purpose is to combat the wrong ascription of own-being to things. He also writes that Nagarjuna denies any ontological foundation.
“Allah! There is no god but He,-the Living, the Self-subsisting, Eternal. No slumber can seize Him nor sleep. His are all things in the heavens and on earth. Who is there can intercede in His presence except as He permitteth? He knoweth what (appeareth to His creatures as) before or after or behind them. Nor shall they compass aught of His knowledge except as He willeth. His Throne doth extend over the heavens and the earth, and He feeleth no fatigue in guarding and preserving them for He is the Most High, the Supreme (in glory).”
“Say: He is Allah, the One and Only; Allah, the Eternal, Absolute; He begetteth not, nor is He begotten; And there is none like unto Him.”
“O ye men! It is ye that have need of Allah: but Allah is the One Free of all wants, worthy of all praise.”
“(He is) the Creator of the heavens and the earth: He has made for you pairs from among yourselves, and pairs among cattle: by this means does He multiply you: there is nothing whatever like unto Him, and He is the One that hears and sees (all things).”
Shantideva argues against a Lord who causes the world. If such a Lord depends on nothing, why does he not create always? If he depends on a set of conditions, the conditions are the cause, not the Lord. If he acts without wishing to, another rules him. If he acts by wishing, he depends on his wish.
“Verily, when He intends a thing, His Command is, "be", and it is!”
God (﷾), the Living, the Self-subsisting
He needs nothing, and all creation needs Him. There is nothing like Him.
Created things
Real, but with their being from Him. Each depends on others, and all that is on earth will perish.
People
Each has need of Him, and each will come to Him alone.
The Real and the True are one word
The Qur'an calls God al-Haqq. Yusuf Ali gives this word as "the Reality" in one verse and "the (very) Truth" in another. In Arabic the real and the true are named by one word. He alone is real in His own right, and that answers the title of this page. A statement is true when it agrees with what is, and God (﷾) knows all that is. So truth does not wait for people to agree.
Nagarjuna was right that people cling to their views. The Qur'an also warns that idle opinion ("fancy") is of no avail against truth. It says that only a little knowledge has been given to us. So no one's opinion is the measure. But that does not mean there is no truth. It means that God (﷾) knows the whole of it and has told us what we need. A person can hold views with humility and still believe that truth exists.
“That is because Allah - He is the Reality; and those besides Him whom they invoke,- they are but vain Falsehood: verily Allah is He, Most High, Most Great.”
“On that Day Allah will pay them back (all) their just dues, and they will realise that Allah is the (very) Truth, that makes all things manifest.”
“Allah! There is no god but He,-the Living, the Self-subsisting, Eternal. No slumber can seize Him nor sleep. His are all things in the heavens and on earth. Who is there can intercede in His presence except as He permitteth? He knoweth what (appeareth to His creatures as) before or after or behind them. Nor shall they compass aught of His knowledge except as He willeth. His Throne doth extend over the heavens and the earth, and He feeleth no fatigue in guarding and preserving them for He is the Most High, the Supreme (in glory).”
“But most of them follow nothing but fancy: truly fancy can be of no avail against truth. Verily Allah is well aware of all that they do.”
“They ask thee concerning the Spirit (of inspiration). Say: "The Spirit (cometh) by command of my Lord: of knowledge it is only a little that is communicated to you, (O men!)"”
Right and wrong rest on the One who knows
The choice is not only between fixed natures and convention. There is a third answer. Right and wrong come from God (﷾), who knows, sees and judges. They are not set by what a society accepts. Each person will come to Him alone. An atom's weight of good or evil will be seen. We were not created in jest. So the one who is harmed is truly there, and the wrong truly counts.
This keeps what Nagarjuna rightly wanted. A deed does depend on more than its outward form: the Prophet (ﷺ) said that deeds are judged by their intentions. And people can truly change. God (﷾) tells those who have wronged themselves not to despair of His mercy, and to turn to Him in repentance. So moral change is safe without emptiness, and right and wrong have a ground that no custom can move.
“(He is) the Creator of the heavens and the earth: He has made for you pairs from among yourselves, and pairs among cattle: by this means does He multiply you: there is nothing whatever like unto Him, and He is the One that hears and sees (all things).”
“And everyone of them will come to Him singly on the Day of Judgment.”
“Then shall anyone who has done an atom's weight of good, see it! And anyone who has done an atom's weight of evil, shall see it.”
“"Did ye then think that We had created you in jest, and that ye would not be brought back to Us (for account)?"”
Umar ibn al-Khattab heard the Prophet (ﷺ) say that deeds are judged by their intentions, and each person receives what he intended. A man who emigrated for worldly gain or to marry a woman has only what he emigrated for.
“Say: "O my Servants who have transgressed against their souls! Despair not of the Mercy of Allah: for Allah forgives all sins: for He is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful.”
“"Turn ye to our Lord (in repentance) and bow to His (Will), before the Penalty comes on you: after that ye shall not be helped.”
| Test | A fixed nature in the deed | Convention alone | The God (﷾) who knows |
|---|---|---|---|
| Can people change? | No: own-being cannot be made | Yes: nothing is fixed | Yes: He calls them to turn to Him, and not to despair of His mercy |
| Does it hold if a whole people disagree? | Yes, if such a nature existed | No: nothing beyond convention could call a cruelty wrong | Yes: each person will come to Him alone |
Let go, and hold on
Emptiness teaches a seeker to let go of what does not last. Islam also warns against clinging to what passes, and then it says what to hold on to. The heart finds its rest in remembering the One who does not pass away. The Qur'an does not ask to be taken on trust. It asks to be read with care and tested. Muhammad (ﷺ) was sent to all people with this message. Read the Qur'an, test it, and ask whether the One it describes is the Real.
“All that is on earth will perish: But will abide (for ever) the Face of thy Lord,- full of Majesty, Bounty and Honour.”
“"Those who believe, and whose hearts find satisfaction in the remembrance of Allah: for without doubt in the remembrance of Allah do hearts find satisfaction.”
“Do they not consider the Qur'an (with care)? Had it been from other Than Allah, they would surely have found therein Much discrepancy.”
“Say: "O men! I am sent unto you all, as the Messenger of Allah, to Whom belongeth the dominion of the heavens and the earth: there is no god but He: it is He That giveth both life and death. So believe in Allah and His Messenger, the Unlettered Prophet, who believeth in Allah and His words: follow him that (so) ye may be guided."”
Perspectives
Madhyamaka: the Middle Way of Nagarjuna
All things are empty of own-being because they arise dependently. This is not the view that nothing exists. Things are true in daily life, the teaching of emptiness is true in that same way, and emptiness is a cure for clinging to views.
Emptiness is dependent arising, not nothingness: what depends on other things has no own-being (Mulamadhyamakakarika 24:18).
Rebuttal
Granted, and this page never calls emptiness nothingness. The Qur'an also says that creation depends. The question is on what. It names the One who is free of all wants, and all people need Him.
Nagarjuna's words are empty and they still work, as a cart carries wood and a pot holds honey (Vigrahavyavartani 22).
Rebuttal
Granted that empty words can do a job. A false rumour does a job too. So doing a job is not what makes a statement true, and the question is what does.
Nagarjuna has no thesis that stands by itself, so the fault cannot fall on him. His claim is true by convention, as every truth is (Vigrahavyavartani 24, 28 and 29).
Rebuttal
"Every truth is true only by convention" is itself a claim about every truth. If it holds whatever people accept, it is its own exception. If it holds only inside a convention, nothing beyond convention makes it true. A scholar of Madhyamaka grants that the question then is why this truth should be adopted and not another. The Qur'an names what truth rests on: Allah (﷾), the Reality.
Emptiness is a medicine for clinging to views, not a view of its own. The school only shows the faults in other views (Mulamadhyamakakarika 13:8).
Rebuttal
A medicine rests on a true diagnosis: the patient is really ill, and this cure really helps. Those are claims about how things are. And a teaching that claims nothing cannot rule out the One who stands by Himself. The Qur'an says that idle opinion ("fancy") is of no avail against truth.
The two truths already answer the question: things are true by convention, and ultimately nothing has own-being (Mulamadhyamakakarika 24:8-10).
Rebuttal
Later teachers of this school say that the ultimate truth, emptiness, is itself empty. So the two truths give no ground beyond convention, and the school holds that none is needed. But then nothing beyond convention makes the teaching true, or makes cruelty wrong. The Qur'an names the ground: Allah (﷾), the Reality.
If goodness were a fixed nature, no one could do right or wrong, and no one could change. So only emptiness keeps morality alive (Vigrahavyavartani 54-55 and 70; Mulamadhyamakakarika 24:33).
Rebuttal
That argument counts against a fixed nature inside a deed. Islam does not need one. Right and wrong rest on God (﷾), who knows and judges. Deeds are judged by their intentions, and people can truly change. He calls them to turn to Him in repentance, and not to despair of His mercy.
Karma makes right and wrong real. Beings are heirs to their deeds, and the law of conditions persists whether or not a Buddha arises (Majjhima Nikaya 135; Samyutta Nikaya 12.20).
Rebuttal
That says what follows a deed. It makes cruelty unwise for the one who does it. It does not say that it ought not to be done. In the Qur'an the One who judges knows and sees, and an atom's weight of good or evil will be seen.
Emptiness grounds compassion: pain has no owner, so all pain must be stopped (Bodhicaryavatara 8:102).
Rebuttal
That gives a reason to treat all pain alike. It does not say why pain must be stopped at all. The "must" is brought in, not shown. Scholars of Buddhism still argue over whether this argument works. In the Qur'an the duty comes from the One to whom each person returns.
A Lord who depends on nothing would create always. If he needs conditions, the conditions are the cause. If he acts by wishing, he depends on his wish (Bodhicaryavatara 9:124-126).
Rebuttal
This treats God's (﷾) will as a need that rules Him. A need comes from a lack, and He is free of all wants. When He intends a thing, He says "be", and it is. So He creates when He wills, and nothing outside Him makes Him act or stops Him.
Buddha-nature teaching
Some Mahayana sutras teach a lasting Buddha-nature in every being. On this reading emptiness is not the last word.
The Mahayana Mahaparinirvana Sutra calls the Buddha-nature in every being the Self. So there is a lasting ground after all.
Rebuttal
If this Self is real, something is not empty, and that sutra and Nagarjuna cannot both be the last word. If it is only a skilful way of speaking, as the same sutra says elsewhere, it grounds nothing. Either way it is not described as a Creator who knows, hears, commands and judges. The Qur'an describes the One who hears and sees.
The Islamic perspective
Created things depend and pass away, as Buddhists see. But they depend on God (﷾), the Living, the Self-subsisting. He is the Real and the Truth, so truth stands, and right and wrong rest on the One who knows and judges.
All that is on earth will perish, and all people have need of God (﷾). The Prophet (ﷺ) said the truest line of a poet is that everything except Allah (﷾) is perishable.
Abraham (pbuh) said of the star, "I love not those that set", and he turned to the One who created the heavens and the earth.
The world is real and it is not God. He created it for just ends, and there is nothing like Him.
Allah (﷾) is the Living, the Self-subsisting. He needs nothing and everything needs Him.
The Qur'an calls Him al-Haqq, one word for the Real and the True. So truth does not wait for people to agree.
If every truth is true only by convention, nothing beyond convention makes the teaching of emptiness true. And a teaching that only removes views cannot rule out a Creator.
Right and wrong rest on the One who knows and judges. Each person will come to Him alone, and an atom's weight of good or evil will be seen.
The Qur'an asks to be read with care, and Muhammad (ﷺ) was sent to all people.